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Paid and unpaid labor in nonprofit organizations: Does the
substitution effect exist?
Abstract
In nonprofit organizations (NPOs) volunteers often work alongside paid workers. Such
a coproduction setting can lead to tension between the two worker groups. This paper
examines for the first time if and how volunteers influence the separation of paid employees,
and thus it contributes to the debate over whether volunteers can substitute paid workers.
Using Austrian data on an organizational level we find a significant impact of volunteers
on the separations of paid workers in NPOs facing increased competition. These findings
support the assumption that a partial substitution effect exists between paid workers and
volunteers.
JEL-Classification: J21, J23, L31
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1 Introduction
In comparison to public and for-profit enterprises, nonprofit organizations (NPOs) can rely
more intensely on unpaid labor in the form of volunteer work. Given the growing importance of
service delivery by NPOs in many countries1 and the fact that these services are labor intensive,
it is astonishing how little is known about the relationship between paid and unpaid labor. In
some organizations, such as self-help groups, volunteers are vital for the very existence of the
organizations, whereas in other organizations they merely constitute an additional input factor,
whereas other NPOs do not have volunteers at all.
This phenomenon of collaboration between paid and unpaid employees has been described
as “coproduction” in the literature (see Brudney and England 1983). While the concept was
originally applied to the public sector, it can be easily generalized into a nonprofit context
(Handy et al. 2008). Coproduction implies that a NPO has to decide whether volunteers
should be involved in the production of goods and services, and if so, which tasks should be
performed by paid professionals and which by volunteer workers. In practice, we find volunteer
workers being active in all kinds of work.
The coproduction setting in NPOs can lead to tension between paid and unpaid labor. While
Brudney and Gazley (2002) find no evidence for an adversarial relationship or a replacement
of paid personnel by volunteers, Handy et al. (2008) as well as Simmons and Emanuele (2010)
address this topic by describing unionized workplaces with provisions in collective agreements
that try to protect paid workers against their replacement by unpaid workers, or workplaces
preclude volunteer involvement entirely. So the question of a substitution effect on paid em-
ployees by volunteers remains thus far unresolved, especially as none of these studies is able to
address directly the influence of volunteers on the separations of paid employees.
In light of this, the following paper aims to shed light on this potentially tense relationship
between paid and unpaid workers, and investigates whether the presence of volunteers increases
separations for paid employees in NPOs to scrutinize the replacement fears expressed by the
above mentioned unions. More specifically, we examine for the first time the direct influence
of volunteer presence on separations of paid employees with nonprofit sector-wide data on an
organizational - and thus, demand - level. In our analyses we compare organizations that face
increased competition and those that operate under unchanged or even reduced competition.
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We make this distinction to account for various circumstances in the economic climates in which
the NPOs operate and which influence separations of paid staff.
Section 2 discusses existing literature concerning the relation between the two worker groups
before positing hypotheses in section 3. Section 4 describes the econometric specification as well
as the data used for the analyses. We apply robustness checks to our results in section 5, present
and discuss our findings in section 6 and provide a brief conclusion in section 7.
2 Background and existing literature
Volunteers’ roles are diverse and not necessarily distinct from paid workers’ roles (Handy et
al. 2008; Netting et al. 2005). Volunteers could either serve as complements or substitutes to
paid employees. In the first case, paid and unpaid workers assume different tasks within the
organization, whereas in the second case, paid employees and volunteers perform similar duties
so that volunteers can basically replace paid staff or vice versa.
In practice, volunteer workers are engaged in managerial or organizational core tasks, as
well as in auxiliary activities, which suggests that paid work and volunteer work can in fact
be interchangeable. However, not all NPOs make use of volunteer labor, while others choose a
mix of paid and unpaid labor to deliver their services, which points to incomplete substitution.
Otherwise, economic logic would suggest using unpaid work exclusively - provided that access
to volunteer work is unlimited. This is a typical assumption made in the study of volunteer
labor supply (see Menchik and Weisbrod 1987). Assuming that both types of work are only
partial substitutes, NPOs’ decisions regarding both task assignments and the levels of paid and
unpaid labor inputs would in theory account for the marginal productivity of each type of labor.
Volunteer labor would then be used until the change in output resulting from a unit change in
volunteer labor equals the contribution of an additional unit of paid labor (Handy et al. 2008).
So far, a few studies have examined the relationship between paid and unpaid personnel.
Essentially, the existing literature seeks to answer two questions. First, there is the aforemen-
tioned discussion if volunteers (mainly) complement paid employees or if the substitution effect
prevails. Second, given that a substitutional relation between the two worker groups does exist,
can we observe an increased displacement of volunteer labor over time or the other way round?
The evidence from the studies examining these two questions is mixed.
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To date, hardly any study has directly examined the changes in firm level demand for paid
workers when volunteer labor is used. Stine (2008) applies a translog cost function to estimate
cross-elasticities in order to determine whether paid and unpaid workers can be considered
substitutes or complements. He finds that volunteers in public libraries act as complements
rather than substitutes to paid staff. However, the approach via cost functions seems to be
particularly difficult in a nonprofit sector context. As Stine noted, it is already difficult to
determine appropriate output variables to estimate translog cost functions for a homogeneous
group like libraries. Accordingly, it seems almost impossible to specify meaningful output
variables for the NPO sector as a whole, given the difficulty in determining the “mission”
(target function) of NPOs. (James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) or Steinberg (2006) provide a
discussion of different NPO objective functions).
Thus, other approaches are prevalent when the focus is on the entire nonprofit sector. Sim-
mons and Emanuele (2010) investigate the association between the amount of donated volunteer
labor and state minimum wage regulations to answer the “substitutability-complementarity”
question. Using individual-level data from volunteers they find that a higher minimum wage in
a state is associated with a higher supply of volunteer labor and infer that volunteers supplant
workers who work on minimum wages. However, the data only reflects volunteer supply and not
specifically the organizational demand. Is more volunteer time offered by individuals because
the NPOs have a higher demand for it? An alternative interpretation, in our view, is that
people offer more volunteer time because higher minimum wages make labor donations more
affordable for individuals.
Regarding the second question, whether paid employees crowd out volunteers over time or
vice versa, both possibilities have been argued. Some authors observe a tendency towards spe-
cialization, professionalization and formalization in organizations which makes the employment
of volunteers harder (see Seippel 2002), while others assume that volunteer work will be even
more significant in the future because of an expected decline of continuity and importance of
traditional paid full-time employment (e.g., Beck 2001) and declining budgets. (For a discus-
sion, see Hustinx, 2007). Handy et al. (2008) report results from two national online surveys
of Canadian nonprofits and a case study of two Canadian hospitals. Based on a case study and
simple correlation analysis using the data from their online surveys, they find different patterns
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of volunteer and paid worker employment. On the one hand, NPOs report a tendency towards
professionalization and thus towards a replacement of volunteers through paid employees, i.e.
a rise in paid staff leads to a decline in the need for volunteers. On the other hand, volunteers
also replace paid workers, especially in times of financial stress. This latter result provides the
first hints that the organizational development of NPOs is an important factor in how volunteer
work is used. Unfortunately, Handy et al. (2008) do not ground their evidence in a multivariate,
econometric framework.
Handy et al. (2008) assert that the replacement process between paid and unpaid work is
complex, oscillates, and is not necessarily stable over time. This, however, is exactly what can
be read from Emanuele (1996), who finds that organizations remain stable over time in the way
they use volunteer input.
In a study of Norwegian sports organizations, Seippel (2002) finds that paid employment
rises with both augmenting organization size and increasing sales returns. The importance
of volunteer work decreases in relation to paid work but not necessarily the time donated by
volunteers.
Additionally, there are two other strands of literature that are worth mentioning for the
purpose of this paper, although they do not discuss the aforementioned questions directly. The
first is concerned with NPO’s demand for voluntary labor in general (Emanuele 1996; Ferris
1988; Handy and Srinivasan 2005). One important finding is that voluntary labor comes at some
cost for NPOs, e.g., for supervising volunteers, providing equipment or office space. Using data
from four US cities (Chicago, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Phoenix) in 1982 and 1984, Emanuele
(1996) presents evidence that NPOs have a consistent and downward sloping demand curve for
volunteer labor over time and hence that the organizations do not accept all proffered volunteer
labor.
The second strand of literature is concerned with paid employees’ attitudes toward volunteers
and the optimal mix between the two worker groups (e.g., Netting et al. 2004; Netting et al.
2005; Rogelberg et al. 2010). Rogelberg et al. (2010) show that poor relations between the two
groups of workers and augmented employee stress and discontent are interrelated. Employees
that show a positive attitude toward volunteers show more organizational commitment and are
less likely to quit.
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Summing up, only a few studies so far have investigated the production-related relationship
and interchangeability over time between paid employees and volunteers. Evidence from exist-
ing research is mixed. We learn from the studies that substitutional as well as complementary
volunteer employment can be found in organizations, depending on the nature of the organiza-
tion and the specific tasks to be performed. However, from existing research, it is reasonable to
believe that especially low-paid workers have reason to feel threatened by volunteer presence,
because unpaid workers can substitute them more easily.
Against this backdrop, our own empirical analysis investigates for the first time directly
whether the use of volunteers influences separations of paid labor in NPOs. By doing so,
we observe changes in employment in NPOs and possible substitution effects. In order to
be accurate about the organizational demand for workers, we use data on an organizational
level. Moreover, our study is concerned with the nonprofit sector as a whole, in order to supply
information on a more general level. In section 3, we will now lay out our hypotheses concerning
the influence of volunteers on paid employees’ separations.
3 Hypotheses
We want to analyze in greater detail the question whether volunteers act as substitutes to paid
employees, and thus examine the influence of volunteer presence on the separations of paid
employees in Austrian NPOs.
In our analyses we use competition as an indicator to distinguish the economic conditions
under which the NPOs operate. Therefore, we differentiate between NPOs facing increased
competition in the five years prior to the survey (i.e. the time period from 2000 to 2005)
and those NPOs facing a stable or favorable economic environment, i.e. observing unchanged
or even decreased competition in that period of time. We argue that the question whether
volunteers act as substitutes or complements might be more pressing in NPOs with increased
competition, which means that paid and unpaid labor can be seen as “conditional” substitutes.
This “conditional substitution hypothesis” is formulated below in two parts.
The Austrian nonprofit sector can be described as “service-dominant”, which means that
most nonprofit employees are active in health and social services.5 NPOs in Austria are often
heavily dependent financially on public funding (e.g., Neumayr et al. 2007; Salamon et al. 2003)
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which presents a serious challenge in times of fiscal austerity. Furthermore, health and social
service providers face increasing competition and tight budgets. Governments have sought to
limit spending on social services by way of introducing new public management and opening
service markets to competition (e.g., Bonoli et al. 2000; Kautto 1997; Starke 2008).
Consequently, NPOs have to seek alternative ways to finance their activities and to maintain
service at a certain level. As a result, NPOs could resort to using volunteer work more heavily in
order to cut labor costs when facing an unfavorable economic environment. Especially in times
of increased competition, replacing paid staff by unpaid workers might be a viable solution in
order to maintain service levels and/or quality while avoiding service disruption. As for paid
employees, they might feel more threatened by a volunteer presence in such a situation, as the
organizations are more prone to lay off paid staff. This could result in a higher propensity to
leave an NPO facing increased competition.
Therefore, our first hypothesis (H1) can be stated as follows: In NPOs facing increased
competition the presence of volunteers leads to higher separations among paid staff in NPOs
using volunteer labor than in those not using volunteer labor. This could be seen as an indicator
for a substitution effect between paid employees and volunteers.
As NPOs have per definition a non-distribution constraint of profits (e.g., Anheier and
Salamon 2006), it is quite plausible to assume that NPOs operating in a stable or favorable
economic environment have a higher probability of reinvesting its profits to help sustain the NPO
or improve their employees’ working conditions. As a consequence, possible positive effects for
the relationship between paid and unpaid workers could emerge. For instance, in such a working
environment the presence of unpaid co-workers could even be seen as positive. Leete (2006, 166)
mentions that nonprofit employees working together with volunteers are perhaps more gratified
than their for-profit counterparts. This must especially be the case in organizations where
volunteers can basically perform the same tasks as paid workers, and ease perhaps the pressures
on paid workers, e.g. through workload sharing. As working conditions are an important
predictor of labor turnover (see Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009 for recent evidence) this can
have a positive influence on retention.
Therefore, we argue that in NPOs facing no competition or even decreased competition
volunteers are perceived more positively by paid employees. Therefore, our second hypothesis
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(H2) can be stated as follows: In NPOs facing no competition the presence of volunteers leads
to lower separations even if volunteers act as substitutes for paid employees.
4 Data and econometric specification
Research in the nonprofit sector is often hindered by insufficient data concerning paid and
unpaid labor due to a lack of compulsory and/or systematic statistical reporting, in contrast to
other established sectors of the economy.
Our work is based on a unique data set for Austria. Data were gathered in 2006 by means
of a mail survey that was sent to all Austrian NPOs with at least one paid employee. We have
information for a myriad of industries that are relevant to the non-profit world, and the ques-
tionnaire placed particular emphasis on employment, income, expenditure and organizational
activities. In total, 5,104 organizations were contacted, and 947 questionnaires were returned,
yielding a response rate of 18.55 per cent. (See Haider et al. (2008) for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the data). In the following we use a subset of 540 organizations for which we have full
information concerning the variables used in the econometric analysis.
As dependent variables we use firm level separations, which are defined as the sum of quits
(“voluntary separations”) and layoffs (“involuntary separations”). To adjust for scale effects
we build the separations rate (SR), by dividing the absolute number of separations of paid
employees through the sum of all paid employees at the end of the year 2005.
The independent variables used are summarized by the vector X. Our main focus lies in the
influence of volunteers on separations of paid staff. This is measured with a dummy variable
taking the value one if the NPO uses volunteers and zero otherwise. In order to control for the
task area of volunteers, four dummy variables are included indicating whether the volunteers
are engaged in managerial tasks, the core tasks of the NPO, administrative tasks, or other tasks.
In addition, further control variables are added to the vector X to explain the separations of
paid employees. We include the logarithm of total employment of the NPOs to control for size
effects in the SR. To cover the employment structure and different employment policies that
are important for separations at the company level, we include the ratio of atypical employees,
measured as workers with a contract for services plus independent contractors (“freie Dienst-
nehmer”) on total employment, as well as the share of employees with an employment duration
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greater than five years. We assume that, on an organizational level, a higher share of atypical
employees reduces hirings and the separations of paid staff. We explain this by the fact that the
presence of atypical employees allows the NPOs to adjust to demand fluctuations without the
need for hiring or separating existing staff, as the workload of atypical employees can be shifted
relatively easily.3 Especially for those NPOs operating in an uncertain funding environment,
this can be an important strategy. In the same way, but for different reasons, we expect the
share of long term employees (employees with employment duration of 5 or more years on total
employees) to reduce separations. Plenty of evidence shows that long term employees exhibit a
reduced probability of terminating an employment contract. Accordingly, this variable can be
considered as a proxy for the existence of employer- or match-specific capital. (see e.g., Farber
1999)
To control for the dependency on public funding, we add a dummy variable that captures
the reliance on public funding. Table 5 in the appendix reveals that 28.3% of all NPOs do not
receive public funding. Moreover, Table 1 shows that the percentage of “no public funding”
in NPOs facing increased competition is 31.1%, approximately five percentage points higher
than the value in NPOs facing no competition (26.3%). A dummy for the existence of work
councils is included to control for the exit-voice hypothesis as proposed by Freeman (1980). We
expect work councils to reduce the separations of paid employees as it offers, aside from the
standard arguments about that hypothesis, a possibility to uncover potential problems in the
collaboration of paid employees and volunteers.
To capture the economic development of the NPOs under observation, we additionally con-
trol whether the development of revenues and expenditures in the five years prior to the survey
have decreased, increased or remained unchanged. Additionally, we include dummy variables to
control for industry affiliation on a 2-digit level. A detailed overview of the summary statistics
for the relevant variables is given in Table 1.
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The dependent variable, SR, has a natural lower bound at zero and contains a nontrivial
number of zeros (307 observations, i.e. 56.85% of all cases), thus a Tobit regression for corner
solution is our starting point.4 We estimate the Tobit regressions, separately for NPOs facing
increased competition and NPOs facing no increased competition:
(1) SRi
* = βX i + ui with ui | X i ∼ Normal(0, σ)
and
(2) SRi = max(0, SRi
*)
The Tobit regressions in (1) is estimated for a latent variable (SR*), conceivable as a propensity
to separate, which is difficult to interpret in corner solution applications and not of direct
interest to the analysis of separation rates. Of greater interest therefore is the unconditional
expected value of the SR, E[SRi | X i], which consists of the probability of being above the limit
and the expected value conditional on being above the limit:
(3) E(SRi | X i) = P (SRi > 0 | X i) · E(SRi | X i, SRi > 0)
As McDonald and Moffit(1980) have shown, a decomposition obtained by a partial derivation
of the unconditional expected value, E[SRi | X i], given in (3) yields the
i) marginal effects on the probability of being above zero,
∂P (SRi > 0 | X i)/∂X i
ii) marginal effects conditional on being above zero,
∂E[SRi | X i, SRi > 0]/∂X i
which both have an interesting economic interpretation.
∂E(SRi | X i)
∂X i
=
∂P (SRi > 0 | X i)
∂X i
· E(SRi | X i, SRi > 0) +
+ P (SRi > 0 | X i) · ∂E(SRi | X i, SRi > 0)
∂X i
(4)
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For our purposes, this means that we concentrate firstly on the effect of the change in the
probability of separating paid staff when a NPO would change their volunteer policy from not
using volunteers to using volunteers, as given by the first product on the right hand side of (4).
And secondly, we will respond to the effect of volunteer presence on separations for those NPOs
that actually lay off paid staff, as given by the second product on the right hand side of (4).
5 Robustness checks
As Tobit regressions are often criticized for not being very robust to a violation of the underlying
assumptions, (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009) we conduct several checks concerning the robust-
ness of our results. First of all, Tobit regressions heavily require normality and homoskedasticity
of the error term. Thus, we conduct a conditional moment (CM) test to control for the nor-
mality of the error term using the tobcm command implemented in STATA (Drukker 2002).
Additionally, we also apply an LM-test to test the Tobit specification against the alternative
of a model with non-linear regressors and a heteroskedastic or non-normally distributed error
term. As the results for both tests (see table 2 and table 3) show problems with the assump-
tions of normality and homoskedasticity of the error term, we furthermore compare the Tobit
estimates divided by the standard error of the regression, σ, with the probit estimates of the
same regression to obtain “a rough idea of the appropriateness of the Tobit model” (Wooldridge
2010, 687). For the probit regression, we design a binary dependent variable with the following
property:
(5) SRi =

1 if SRi > 0
0 if SRi = 0
This comparison reveals that the coefficients of both models are relatively similar and that
there are no significant sign changes between the Tobit/σ model and the probit model. There-
fore, we conclude that the econometric specification is roughly appropriate and thus classify our
results as credible even if the CM and LM tests reject the requirements for a properly specified
Tobit error term. For the results of the coefficient comparisons see table 6 in the appendix.
To further check the robustness of our results and to circumvent the problems with the
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strong assumptions that the Tobit model places on the error term, u, we additionally estimate
a linear probability model (LPM). The LPM has the advantage that although its error term is
heteroskedastic by definition, it can account for the heteroskedasticity by using robust standard
errors as obtained by White (1980) so that the LPM model will definitely report unbiased point
estimates. Furthermore, the parameters of the LPM can directly be interpreted as marginal
effects. For the LPM we use on the one hand the SR as constructed in (5) and on the other
hand convert the SR additionally into a binary variable with the following property:
(6) SRi =

1 if SRi ≥ µ(SR)
0 if SRi < µ(SR)
at which µ is the mean of SR. Hence, we estimate the influence of the volunteer presence
of receiving a SR at/above or below the mean value of the SR. This is done again separately
for NPOs under increased competition and those with decreasing or stable competition. The
results of the Tobit models for NPOs facing increased competition can be found in table 2, the
results of the Tobit models for NPOs with decreased or unchanged competition are given in
table 3. The results of the LPM for both types of NPOs are given in table 4.
To conduct a further check whether our results are robust irrespective of the choice of the
functional form and the estimation method used, we will also apply a method particularly
suitable for rates or fractions as dependent variables, as this is the case with the SR. One
possibility of dealing with rates in the dependent variable is a beta regression framework which
builds on the beta distribution. The beta distribution can handle various distributional shapes,
assuming that the dependent variable can be regarded as continuous and bounded in an interval
with two known endpoints. Therefore, beta regressions are very flexible concerning the problem
of nonnormality in the error term or heteroskedasticity, a problem both in Tobit and LPM
models. The beta density with the shape parameters p and q is given by:
(7) pi(y; p, q) =
Γ(p+ q)
Γ(p)Γ(q)
yp−1(1− y)q−1
with 0<y<1, p, q > 0, and Γ(·) denoting the gamma function. As the shape parameters
are difficult to interpret with regard to conditional expectations in a regression framework,
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an alternative parametrization of the beta regression was independently proposed by Paolino
(2001), Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) and Smithson and Verkuilen (2006). To achieve a
“regression friendly” version of the beta distribution in (7) these authors reparameterize the
shape parameters p and q into location and dispersion (or precision) parameters. For this
purpose, they let p = µφ and q = (1− µ)φ. Then the beta density in (7) can be rewritten as:
(8) f(y;µ, φ) =
Γ(φ)
Γ(µφ)Γ((1− µ)φ)y
µφ−1(1− y)(1−µ)φ−1
with 0<y<1 and φ > 0. The dependent variable y is now y ∼ B(µ, φ) and E(y) = µ with
var(y) = µ(1−µ)1+φ . If Y is a random variable with yi ∼ B(µi, φ) and i = 1, ..., n the beta
regression model is
(9) g(µi) = xiβ
where β is a vector of regression parameters and xi is the vector of covariates. Using a logit link
function for g(·) it is assured that the dependent variable lies in the unit interval and equation
(9) becomes, ln( µ1−µ) = xiβ, which is estimated in our application.
5 To shift the observations
at the margins 0 and 1 into the unit interval we use the transformation y′ = [y(N − 1) + 0.5]/N
as proposed by Smithson and Verkuilen (2006). Results for the beta regression can be found in
table 4 and a discussion of all results follows in section 6.
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Table 2: Tobit regression for NPOs with increasing competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SR* ∂E[SR|X]/∂X ∂Pr[SR > 0|X]/∂X E[SR|X,SR > 0]/∂X
Volunteer dummy 0.168** 0.076** 0.244** 0.057**
(0.067) (0.031) (0.099) (0.023)
Managerial tasks -0.020 -0.009 -0.030 -0.007
(0.065) (0.030) (0.095) (0.022)
Main tasks -0.126** -0.052* -0.181** -0.040**
(0.059) (0.027) (0.087) (0.020)
Administrative tasks -0.098 -0.042 -0.143 -0.032
(0.061) (0.028) (0.090) (0.021)
Other tasks -0.032 -0.014 -0.047 -0.011
(0.063) (0.029) (0.093) (0.022)
Employer size 0.093*** 0.043*** 0.137*** 0.032***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.031) (0.007)
Atypical employees -0.073*** -0.034*** -0.108*** -0.025***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.032) (0.007)
Long term employees -0.334*** -0.154*** -0.493*** -0.114***
(0.085) (0.039) (0.125) (0.029)
Work council -0.123* -0.050* -0.175* -0.039*
(0.064) (0.029) (0.094) (0.022)
Public funding 0.047 0.022 0.069 0.016
(0.047) (0.021) (0.069) (0.016)
Increased revenues 0.014 0.006 0.020 0.005
(0.083) (0.038) (0.122) (0.028)
Unchanged revenues -0.006 -0.003 -0.009 -0.002
(0.088) (0.041) (0.130) (0.030)
Increased expenditures 0.136 0.054 0.193 0.042
(0.129) (0.060) (0.191) (0.044)
Unchanged expenditures 0.127 0.068 0.186 0.049
(0.140) (0.064) (0.206) (0.048)
Sector affiliation YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.196
(0.135)
Observations 228 228 228 228
McKelvey/Zavoina Pseudo R2 0.396
BIC 243.279
CM Test 33.167**
LM Test 24.812***
Log likelihood -70.061
Marginal effects in columns (2), (3) and (4).
Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean for continuous variables and for discrete change of 0 to 1 for
dummy variables.
Following Veall and Zimmermann (1994) we use the pseudo R2 of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) for Tobit
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Tobit regressions for NPOs with decreasing/stable competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SR* ∂E[SR|X]/∂X ∂Pr[SR > 0|X]/∂X ∂E[SR|XSR > 0]/∂X
Volunteer dummy -0.066 -0.023 -0.065 -0.019
(0.096) (0.032) (0.094) (0.027)
Managerial tasks 0.111 0.037 0.108 0.031
(0.083) (0.028) (0.081) (0.023)
Main tasks 0.047 0.016 0.047 0.013
(0.074) (0.025) (0.072) (0.021)
Administrative tasks -0.020 -0.007 -0.019 -0.006
(0.070) (0.023) (0.068) (0.020)
Other tasks 0.168** 0.065*** 0.171** 0.051**
(0.072) (0.024) (0.070) (0.020)
Employer size 0.100*** 0.033*** 0.098*** 0.028***
(0.026) (0.009) (0.025) (0.007)
Atypical employees -0.015 -0.005 -0.014 -0.004
(0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.005)
Long term employees -0.378*** -0.126*** -0.369*** -0.106***
(0.092) (0.031) (0.090) (0.026)
Work council 0.019 0.006 0.019 0.005
(0.088) (0.029) (0.086) (0.025)
Public funding -0.071 -0.023 -0.068 -0.019
(0.062) (0.021) (0.060) (0.017)
Increased revenues 0.119 0.039 0.115 0.033
(0.108) (0.036) (0.106) (0.030)
Unchanged revenues 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.119) (0.040) (0.116) (0.033)
Increased expenditures -0.470*** -0.221*** -0.471*** -0.166***
(0.150) (0.050) (0.146) (0.042)
Unchanged expenditures -0.390** -0.090 -0.305* -0.091*
(0.168) (0.056) (0.164) (0.047)
Sector affiliation YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.215
(0.137)
Observations 312 312 312 312
McKelvey/Zavoina Pseudo R2 0.252
BIC 388.503
CM Test 22.832**
LM Test 39.152***
Log likelihood -139.693
Marginal effects in columns (2), (3) and (4).
Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean for continuous variables and for discrete change of 0 to 1 for
dummy variables.
Following Veall and Zimmermann (1994) we use the pseudo R2 of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) for Tobit
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Regression results for the robustness checks
NPOs increasing competition NPOs decreasing/stable competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LPM at 0 LPM at µ Beta Reg. LPM at 0 LPM at µ Beta Reg.
Volunteer dummy 0.210** 0.221** 0.050* -0.023 -0.053 -0.018
(0.083) (0.099) (0.025) (0.085) (0.087) (0.032)
Managerial tasks -0.040 -0.045 -0.017 0.123 0.064 0.024
(0.084) (0.091) (0.023) (0.075) (0.075) (0.027)
Main tasks -0.062 -0.055 -0.016 -0.002 0.029 0.005
(0.077) (0.083) (0.021) (0.067) (0.069) (0.024)
Administrative tasks -0.078 -0.042 -0.024 -0.027 0.021 0.001
(0.081) (0.086) (0.021) (0.063) (0.066) (0.023)
Other tasks -0.008 -0.046 -0.005 0.124* 0.122* 0.043
(0.073) (0.081) (0.022) (0.068) (0.067) (0.027)
Employer size 0.194*** 0.124*** 0.033*** 0.199*** 0.072*** 0.023***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.008) (0.022) (0.025) (0.009)
Atypical employees -0.067*** -0.058*** -0.014*** -0.015 -0.029*** -0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.020) (0.009) (0.006)
Long term employees -0.333*** -0.319*** -0.085*** -0.228*** -0.201*** -0.050*
(0.094) (0.096) (0.029) (0.067) (0.065) (0.026)
Work council -0.068 -0.155 -0.031 0.047 0.093 0.016
(0.078) (0.096) (0.021) (0.083) (0.091) (0.032)
Public funding 0.001 0.060 0.009 -0.017 0.002 -0.010
(0.059) (0.066) (0.017) (0.053) (0.054) (0.018)
Increased revenues 0.032 0.002 0.003 0.026 0.026 0.017
(0.102) (0.099) (0.028) (0.081) (0.077) (0.029)
Unchanged revenues 0.031 -0.041 -0.005 -0.033 0.010 -0.006
(0.120) (0.117) (0.031) (0.089) (0.084) (0.032)
Increased expenditures 0.155 0.101 0.012 -0.275* -0.375** -0.109*
(0.119) (0.120) (0.037) (0.157) (0.150) (0.065)
Unchanged expenditures 0.158 0.152 0.012 -0.259 -0.342** -0.071*
(0.160) (0.159) (0.048) (0.172) (0.164) (0.041)
Sector affiliation YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.034 0.106 -2.396*** 0.338** 0.554*** -1.278
(0.122) (0.126) (0.380) (0.158) (0.154) (0.379)
Observations 228 228 228 312 312 312
BIC -687.402 -1236.541
Log likelihood 395.280 672.829
R-squared 0.378 0.206 0.305 0.118
Marginal effects for beta regressions; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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6 Empirical results and discussion
From the regression results in table 2, it becomes apparent that concerning the first hypothesis,
H1, regarding NPOs facing increased competition, we can corroborate this hypothesis. Indeed,
the presence of volunteers increases significantly the separations of paid staff. Column (3) of
table 2 reveals that the probability of separations for NPOs under increased competition is
24.4% higher if the NPOs can use volunteers in their operations. The LPM gives a similar
result for NPOs under increased competition as it states that the probability of separations is
21.0% higher if NPOs have access to volunteers (column (1), table 4). Moreover, NPOs with
volunteers are also more likely to have separations at or above the mean of the SR (column
(2), table 4). Concerning those NPOs that actually lay off paid employees the Tobit regression
result shows that the SR increases by 5.7% points if the NPOs make use of volunteers (column
(4), table 2). This is comparable to the result of the beta regression for NPOs with increasing
competition. Column 3 in table 4 states that for a NPO with a SR of 12% (i.e. at the sample
mean) the involvement of volunteers increases the SR by 5% points, which is an increase in the
SR of more than 40% for NPOs with volunteers compared to NPOs without volunteers. The
Tobit regression results for NPOs with increasing competition show that the higher SR due to
volunteer involvement is attenuated by the opposite effect of a reduced SR when volunteers are
engaged in main tasks. However, as the robustness checks reject the statistical significance of
this effect we dismiss the significant influence of this attenuating effect. The logarithmic size
is the only other variable influencing the separations positively on a relevant statistical level.
Further statistical significant control variables reducing the SR are, as expected, the share of
atypical employees, the share of employees with a length of employment of more than five years,
and the work council.
The second hypothesis, H2, relating to the separations of paid staff in NPOs facing decreasing
or stable competition, cannot be corroborated. Although the coefficient goes in the expected
direction the volunteer presence has no statistically significant influence on the SR of paid staff
in those NPOs (see results table 3). The only exception are NPOs with volunteers engaged in
other tasks. In that case, the SR increases significantly, contrary to our hypothesis, even when
a NPO faces a stable or decreasing competition. The LPM again delivers similar results as the
Tobit regressions since it also shows no significant influence of the volunteer dummy on the SR.
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Concerning the further control variables, it becomes apparent that the atypical employees (only
in the LPM at µ) as well as the employees with length of service of more than five years again
significantly reduces the separations in these NPO, for reasons described in section 4. Unlike in
the case for NPOs with increased competition, the expenditure variable becomes significant for
NPOs facing decreasing or stable competition. Compared to decreased expenditures, increased
and unchanged expenditures reduce the SR for NPOs facing decreasing or stable competition.
As previously explained, the Austrian NPO sector is “service-dominant”, which implicates that
the services offered are mostly labor intensive. In addition, with the non-distribution constraint
of profits for NPOs, we can assume that the NPOs facing stable or declined competition are
capitalizing on a friendly economic environment to reinvest money in working conditions, leading
to a reduced SR.
In summary, our findings point to the existence of a conditional substitution effect. NPOs
facing increased competition have higher separations when volunteers are involved in the NPO
operations. It seems apparent from our results that volunteers in these NPOs may be used in
order to replace paid workers. In NPOs with stable or decreased competition we find no sta-
tistically significant influence of volunteers on separations of paid employees with the exception
of an increasing effect in the case of volunteers engaged in other tasks.
7 Conclusion
Volunteer work is a major labor source for NPOs. Nevertheless, comparatively little research
exists concerning relations between volunteers and paid staff. In this paper, we analyzed the
influence of volunteer workers on separations of paid employees in NPOs. Previous studies have
either analyzed only specific sectors and/or public organizations or used individual-level data
to investigate the relation between paid work and volunteer work. By contrast, in this paper we
studied the volunteer presence with sector-wide data on an organizational – and thus demand
– level. We also distinguished between organizations in a different competitive environment.
By doing so we emphasized the importance of the economic environment when looking at the
relationship between volunteers and paid employees.
The results show that volunteer presence leads to more separations in NPOs facing increased
competition, but has no influence on separations in NPOs with stable or decreased competition.
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We interpret our findings with the existence of a conditional substitution effect of volunteers
on paid workers that has been discussed previously in the literature. Paid workers seem indeed
to be replaced by volunteer workers especially in times of economic adverse conditions such as
increased competition. This can lead to possible tensions between the two worker groups.
Against the backdrop of public austerity policies, the funding environment of NPOs is ex-
pected to become ever more challenging. At the same time, the political rhetoric encourages
civic engagement and volunteer work. Thus, indications are that NPOs will continue, and maybe
revive, their use of volunteer labor in order to sustain the level and quality of services they pro-
vide to society, especially in social care and health care. Policy makers and organizations alike
should be aware of possible tensions between volunteers and paid staff when employing both
worker groups. Research on the relation between both types of workers is highly relevant and
should therefore continue.
However, due to the relatively small sample size, our results on the substitution of paid
staff and volunteers must be interpreted with caution and should be understood as a starting
point for further research on that topic. Moreover, we also suggest using panel data for future
analyses.
8 Endnotes
1.) For a sample of 35 countries Salamon et al. (2003) find that the total workforce for the
nonprofit sector for the years 1995-1998 is 39.5 million fulltime equivalent workers. As a conse-
quence, the nonprofit sector employs on average 4.4% of the economically active population. In
comparative figures for the investigated countries (inter alia, the USA, Japan, and Germany)
this means tenfold higher employment than the utilities and textile industries and fivefold more
workers than the food manufacturing industry and 20% more workers than the transportation
industry (Salamon et al. 2003: 13f.)
2.) It is interesting to note that there are no statutory minimum wages in Austria. Mini-
mum wages, among other regulations, are part of collective bargaining agreements that apply
to specific industries. In May 2006, a collective bargaining agreement regulating labor issues
was introduced to health and social service industries, two of the most important industries in
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the Austrian nonprofit sector. There are no federal or regions statutes concerning the use of
volunteers in Austria.
3.) See, for example Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) for a dynamic model concerning the
influence of flexible labor contracts on employment. Boockmann and Hagen (2005) provide
empirical evidence for Germany on that phenomenon.
4.) Wooldridge (2010, Ch. 17) clarifies the distinction between corner solution responses and
the problem of censored data, which both make use of the Tobit model structure.
5.) For a detailed discussion of the beta regression we refer to the cited authors. To con-
duct the beta regressions in STATA we use the module betafit written by Buis et al. (2012).
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10 Appendix
Table 5: Summary statistics all NPOs
Mean sd Min Max
Separations Rate 0.108 0.195 0.000 1.000
Volunteer dummy 0.591 0.492 0.000 1.000
Mangerial tasks 0.435 0.496 0.000 1.000
Main tasks 0.259 0.439 0.000 1.000
Administrative tasks 0.330 0.471 0.000 1.000
Other tasks 0.194 0.396 0.000 1.000
Employer size 2.036 1.329 0.000 8.097
Atypical employees 0.449 1.907 0.000 21.250
Long term employees 0.426 0.319 0.000 1.000
Work council 0.137 0.344 0.000 1.000
Public funding 0.283 0.451 0.000 1.000
Increased revenues 0.611 0.488 0.000 1.000
Unchanged revenues 0.254 0.436 0.000 1.000
Reduced revenues 0.135 0.342 0.000 1.000
Increased expenditures 0.800 0.400 0.000 1.000
Unchanged expenditures 0.148 0.356 0.000 1.000
Reduced expenditures 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000
Education 0.402 0.491 0.000 1.000
Health and social work 0.241 0.428 0.000 1.000
Activities of membership organizations 0.276 0.447 0.000 1.000
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.059 0.236 0.000 1.000
Observations 540
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Table 6: Tobit/σ – probit coefficient comparison
Increased competition Decreased competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit/σ Probit Tobit/σ Probit
Volunteer dummy 0.625∗∗ 0.881∗∗ -0.177 -0.223
Managerial tasks -0.078 -0.334 0.298 0.520∗
Main tasks -0.468∗∗ -0.082 0.126 0.100
Administrative tasks -0.364 -0.288 -0.054 -0.113
Other tasks -0.119 -0.083 0.450∗∗ 0.590∗∗
Employer size 0.346∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
Atypical employees -0.271∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.081
Long term employees -1.242∗∗∗ -1.447∗∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗ -1.110∗∗∗
Work council -0.457∗ -0.331 0.051 0.186
Public funding 0.175 0.107 -0.190 -0.140
Increased revenues 0.052 0.026 0.319 0.164
Unchanged revenues -0.026 0.048 0.019 -0.065
Increased expenditures 0.506 0.748 -1.260∗∗∗ -1.140∗∗
Unchanged expenditures 0.472 0.785 -1.046∗∗ -1.117∗∗
Industry affiliation YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.196 -1.932∗∗∗ 0.215 -0.912
Observations 228 228 312 312
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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